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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, intellectual property has played an
increasingly important role in the global economy.' Many of this

country's leading companies have more value in their intangible assets,
in the form of patents, copyrights, trademarks, etc. than their tangible
assets. Furthermore, business-bankruptcy filings are up thirty-eight
percent in 2009 from the previous year.2 Businesses that wish to protect
their assets in the event of a bankruptcy are concerned about what
happens to intellectual property rights that have been assigned, licensed,
or sold prior to, or during bankruptcy proceedings.' The rise in business
bankruptcies coupled with the increased role of intellectual property in
business portfolios makes it paramount that the legal community clearly
define the rights and duties of creditors and debtors.
Many recent bankruptcy cases dealing with patent rights have
highlighted the need for clarity regarding competing patent interests,
particularly in light of complex modem-day business dealings such as
secured transactions.

In a recent case, In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., a

high technology company entered into bankruptcy. Their most valuable
asset was a patent relating to the detection of data embedded in a video
signal (e.g., television), which had a high potential for generating
revenue, especially in light of the convergence of video and data
technologies. Both the trustee and creditor were vying for their rights
in the patent, and the deciding factor for who possessed priority lay in
1. Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic
Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 733, 735 (2007). The article cites a study which found that the
ratio of tangible assets to intangible assets among major industrial companies of the world switched
from 62%/38% in 1982 to 38%/62% one decade later. Id.
2. Eric Morath,Automated Access to Court ElectronicRecords, Economic Crisis Sends 2009
Business-Bankruptcy Filings Up 38% (2010), http://www.aacer.com. Experts predict businessbankruptcy filings will stay at such high levels in 2010. Id.
3. See Peter J. Toren et al., The Intersection ofIntellectualProperty and Bankruptcy Law, 78
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 201, 201 (2009).
4. LANNING BREYER & MELVIN SEMINSKY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS

AND ACQUISITIONS 4-6 (2001). The authors proclaim that using intellectual property assets to
obtain financing is one of the hot topics of IP management today. See MELVIN SIMENSKY &
LANNING G. BRYER, THE NEW ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS § 8.4(a), 300 (J. Wiley & Sons 1994).
5. See, e.g., Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 (2002); City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83
B.R. 780, 780 (D. Kan. 1988); In re Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 637 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1985).
6. Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1039.
7.

Steven C. Sereboff & Michael Kogan, RECORDATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN IP

RIGHTS 1, www.socalip.com/RecordationArticle.pdf (last visited July 3, 2010).
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the issue presented in this article, namely, whether perfection of a
security interest is governed by federal or state law.
A security interest must be perfected in accordance with the law,
usually through registration of the security interest in the appropriate
register or office.9 The date that a security interest is perfected can be
critical; for example, in the event that a lender must collect against the
security interest, i.e., the lendee goes into bankruptcy, the perfection date
10
is vital in securing a lender's priority over other subsequent claims. As
between two competing creditors, the creditor that possesses the earlier
perfection date has priority and will, therefore, be awarded the
ownership rights to the disputed bankruptcy property."
The Patent Act establishes a federal scheme for regulating property
rights associated with patents, and the duties that patent holders have to
secure those property rights.12 Section 261 of the Patent Act ("Section
261") sets forth the rule that in order to protect an "assignment, grant or
conveyance" against "subsequent purchasers and mortgagees," the
transaction must be recorded with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO"). 3 This system of federal regulation of the
transfer of property rights in patents provides constructive notice to
potential subsequent purchasers and mortgagees.14
On its face, the statute seems to clearly regulate all property rights
However, an "assignment, grant, or
associated with patents.'s
conveyance" does not expressly refer to property rights in terms of
security interests.' 6 Courts have argued that this statutory language
suggests that section 261 of the Patent Act concerns itself with only
ownership rights, as opposed to lesser rights such as liens or licenses.
These courts argue that assignments, grants, and conveyances deal only
with transfers of title.' 8 However, security interests are not transfers of

8. Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1045.
9. LANNING BREYER & MELVIN SEMINSKY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS 11-27 (2001).

10. Id. According to the Senate in 1836, the federal scheme was developed in part because
the states "within their narrow limits, could give very little encouragement to inventors by grants of
exclusive privileges." Id. Non-uniform laws of the states gave rise to confusion, increasing
litigation that burdened the courts, and opened the door to fraudulent and worthless patents. Id.
I1. Id.
12. See In re Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 638 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).
18. Id. at 1049.
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title, but rather give the lender a lien on the patent property as collateral
for a loan. 9 The issue is whether section 261 covers the perfection of
security interests in patents, or whether Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("Article 9"), as adopted by individual states,
governs.
Under Article 9, filing with the state is required to perfect a security
interest.2o Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit declared that, as between two
lien holders, all that is required to perfect a security interest is the filing
requirement under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and that
registering with the PTO under the federal Patent Act is not required.2 '
On the other hand, proponents of a federal registration scheme have
argued that because federal law preempts state law, the Patent Act
governs, and, therefore, registration with the PTO under section 261 is
required to perfect a security interest in a patent.22 Although section 261
does not expressly provide for federal preemption, courts may imply
preemption either through congressional intent,23 or by declaring that the
federal regulatory scheme for patents is so pervasive as to "occupy the
field" in this area of law.24 The Constitution of the United States
entrusts Congress with the promotion "of Progress of Science and useful
Arts," which gave Congress the power to create the PTO and prompted
Congress to enact the Copyright Act and the Patent Act. 25 It seems hard
to imagine what could be more persuasive as to the pervasiveness of an
area of law than a constitutional mandate to provide for said area of law.
Nevertheless, courts have found some textual interpretation and
legislative history to support the proponent that Congress did not intend
for the federal registration system to include liens on patents as collateral
for security interests.26
Although an analysis of modem-day congressional intent favors
state law to govern perfection of security interests in patents,27 both
statute2 8 and policy considerationS29 demand that Congress update
19. See Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial
Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1657 (1996).
20. U.C.C. §9-303(1) (2000).
21. CyberneticSerys., 252 F.3d at 1059.
22. Id. at 1046.
23. Id. at 1045-46.
24. Gade v. Nat'1 Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,98 (1992).
25. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1048-50.
27. Infra Part III. .C.
28. Infra Part III.1.A-B (textual analysis of Section 261) and Part 111.2.B (discussion of
Article 9 step-back provisions).
29. Infra Part 1II.3 (discussion of policy considerations supporting federal filing).
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section 261 to provide for a federal registration system of security
interests in patents, in order to be consistent with the modem-day
economic landscape and the intent of the Framers under the original
constitutional mandate under Article I.
The state of the law regarding perfection of security interests in
patents is uncertain.o Attorneys advise their clients to record with both
the state and the federal registration systems in order to perfect their
security interests.3 1 Moreover, the Supreme Court missed its opportunity
to clarify the ambiguity when it denied certiorari to Cybernetic
Services.32 This comment will attempt to make sense of this area of the
law and formulate an opinion as to what the law should be. Part II of
this comment will interpret Section 261 through textual analysis, canons
of construction, and legislative history. Part III will explore federal
preemption law in the context of perfection of security interests in
patents. Part III will also examine the hodgepodge that is the case law
regarding perfection of security interests and patent law. Finally, Part
IV will look at some policy considerations for resolving the matter.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT LAW AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN
INTANGIBLES

A.

Evolution of the PatentAct

The American patent system has its origins in English patent law,
in particular, from the system established by the Statute of Monopolies
of 1624.33 The English Parliament passed this statute to restrict the
34
government's right to grant monopolies to inventors to fourteen years.

30. See Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1659-60. Although it common practice to file security
interests in patents with both the state and federal filing system, it is unclear whether a federal filing
would actually put subsequent purchasers and mortgagees on notice. Pauline Stevens, Security
Interests in Patents and Patent Applications, 6 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POLY 3, § 7 (2005). In fact
the Code of Federal Regulations states that filing such documents with the PTO does not constitute
an acknowledgement that the document has any effect. Id. If Section 261 is interpreted as not
encompassing the filing of security interests in patents, actual or inquiry notice will need to be
proved for secured creditors to protect themselves against the claims of subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees, even if the secured creditors filed with the PTO. See id.
31. James 3. Paige, Taking Security Interests in Intellectual Property, MARTINDALE.COM
(May 13, 2004), http://www.martindale.com/intellectual-property-law/article-Fredrikson-ByronP.A._2856.htm.
32. Pauline Stevens, Security Interests in Patentsand PatentApplications, 6 U. PITT. J. TECH.
L. & POL'Y 32,42 (2005).
33. JAN FAGERBERG & DAVID C. MOWERY, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 269
(2005).
34. Id.
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The statute attempted to prevent the monarchy from arbitrarily granting
monopolies to inventors for indeterminate amounts of time, as royal
favors on such everyday items as vinegar, starch, and playing cards."
Before American independence, many States adopted their own patent
laws, although only South Carolina gave its inventors a monopoly on
their new inventions for a limited period of fourteen years under the
"Act for the Encouragement of the Arts and Science" of 1784.
Prior to the first Patent Act, Thomas Jefferson expressed concerns
about the dangers of granting monopolies on inventions and was
unconvinced that it was necessary for the advancement of innovation.
On the other hand, James Madison was one of the major proponents for
a federal patent system." In The Federalist No. 43, Madison declared
that "the States cannot separately make effectual provision" for the
protection of innovation, thus responsibility for providing such
protection should be entrusted to the Congress of the United States.39
Subsequently, in 1789, the Constitution of the United States was
enacted, giving Congress the power to promote the "[p]rogress of the ...
useful [a]rts" by giving inventors a monopoly on the making, using and
selling of their inventions for a limited time, in exchange for disclosure
of the invention to the general public.40 In the words of Justice Story,
without a central system for regulating patents, inventors would be
"subjected to the varying laws and systems of the different states on this
subject, which would impair, and might even destroy the value of their
rights.'I
The first federal patent statute was passed in 1790, giving
jurisdiction to issue patents to a board consisting of the Attorney
General, Secretary of War, and the Secretary of State.42 Just a few years
later, Congress passed the Patent Act of 1793, making patent-granting an
administrative function, because the board could not devote much time
to granting patents due to other duties and responsibilities of their high

35. ToSHiKo TAKENAK, PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 360 (2008).
36. ROBERT C. KAHRL, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION § 2.03[C], at 2-17(2001).

37. Id. at § 2.031D], 2-19.
38. Id.
39. The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 502, at
402 (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987).
42. S. Rep. No. 1979, at 2-3 (1952). The first Patent Act was enacted during the second
session of Congress. Id.
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offices.
The Patent Act of 1793 indiscriminately granted a patent to
anyone who met the formal filing requirements and paid the set fees."
Due to dissatisfaction over the granting of patents indiscriminately
without consideration of patent novelty or other matters, the Senate
selected a committee, which created a bill that was passed in 1836,
laying the foundation for our current patent system.4 5 It created the
Commissioner of Patents and a system of examiners that could refuse
patent applications for various reasons, including lack of novelty.46
In 1870, as part of an effort to consolidate and streamline all of the
laws of the United States, Congress appointed a Committee on Patents to
consolidate the existing provisions in the Patent Act and make
amendments affecting some matters of substance.4 7 The current version
of the Patent Act was enacted in 1952 as part of the codification of Title
35, United States Code, and involves primarily simplification and
streamlining of the statutory language and a few substantive changes.48
While the Patent Act has been expanded and amended over time,
the fundamental goals remain the same: 1) incentives for innovators to
create, and 2) the disclosure of new and useful ideas to the public in
order to advance science and industry.49 Over 200 years after James

43. Id. at 3. Various amendments to the Patent Act of 1836 were made, including the addition
of designs as patentable subject matter in 1842. Id.
44. Id The 24th Congress declared that many "evils" resulted from the Patent Act of 1793
because it granted patents without consideration of novelty or utility. S. Rep. No. 239, at 2 (1836).
It listed some of the evils as:
1. A large mumber of patents were useless and void, as they infringed on one another
and the public domain. This was the result of due attention being given to the
claims and ignorance of the state of the art in this and other countries.
2. It resulted in a flooding of patent monopolies that encumbered legitimate patents and
it was embarrassing because it resulted in patents of even the most common and
long-known simple improvements.
3. Courts became flooded with the numerous patent infringement cases that arose.
4. Fraud became an extensive and serious problem. It was not uncommon for a person
to copy a patent and then make a slight alteration and apply for a patent of the
resulting device.
Because patents were granted indiscriminately, without
consideration of novelty, such person would receive a patent. That person would
then sell the device to members of the public who would later find out that they
purchased a device that they had no right to use because it was obtained
fraudulently.
Id. at 2-3. Because of these evils, the value of patents decreased to the point of having little or no
value to genuine patentees. Id. at 4.
45. Id.
46. Id
47. S. Rep. No. 1979, at 2-3 (1952).
48. Id. at 4.
49. Kewanee Oil Co. v. BicronCorp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). The original source of the
patent law is the Constitution, granting Congress the power to "promote the Progress of.. .useful
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Madison urged the Framers to give the national government the duty to
regulate patents, rather than leave it to the States,"o America is again
faced with the issue of whether state or federal law is the best way to
encourage innovation through the protection of patent rights."
B.

Evolution of the Text of Section 261 of the PatentAct

The particular part of the Patent Act that this comment is primarily
concerned with is section 261, the recording provision.5 2 The recording
provision provides for public notice to protect "subsequent purchasers
Congress
and mortgagees" from unrecorded interests in a patent.
enacted the first recording provision of the Patent Act in the 1793
amendment, which required filing with the office of the Secretary of
State. 5 4 The Patent Act of 1836 required recordation with the PTO, an
administrative office that was newly created by the same statute. 5 The
Patent Act of 1870 added the language that an assignment would be void
against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee, if it was not
recorded with the PTO in the allotted time.56 This amendment thereby
clarified, or limited the protection provided by the recording statute to
The current
subsequent bona fide "purchasers" and "mortgagees." 5
language in
the
as
same
the
essentially
version of the recording statute is
the 1870 version, providing, in part that:
[a]n assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser or .mortgagee for a valuable consideration,
without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480. Patent laws were created to
promote this progress by offering inventors incentives in the form of limited-term monopolies to
offset the risk of enormous amounts of time and money invested into research and development. Id.
In exchange for a limited-term monopoly, an inventor is required to disclose his or her invention to
the public in such a way that one of ordinary skill in the art would be enabled to reproduce the
invention. Id. at 480-81. The idea is that once a patent is granted and the disclosure of such patent
is circulated throughout the general public, the addition into the general store of knowledge will
further stimulate innovation, insight, and creativity, resulting in more advancement in the art. Id.
The benefit to society would be new, useful, and improved products introduced into the economy to
create jobs and a better quality of life for Americans. Id.
50. The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison).
51. Supra note 5.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
53. See id.
54. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, § 4, 1 Stat. 318-23 (1793).
55. Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). Although this amendment added
the requirement to record with the PTO, obviously, it is not clear whether security interests are
required to be recorded with the PTO. Id
56. Patent Act of 1870, Ch. 230, § 36, 16 Stat. 198-217 (1870).
57. See id.
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Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such
subsequent purchase or mortgage.58
Although the language has not changed much since 1870, the economic
Using
backdrop of patent interests has significantly evolved.
applications
and
patent
as
patents
such
property,
intangible personal
("patents"), to secure financing is commonplace in today's business
world, but it was relatively scarce in the nineteenth century. 0 Use of the
federal patent system to secure property rights in inventions has
significantly grown since then. 6 ' Also, the range of interested parties has
significantly expanded to include not just inventors, assignees,
purchasers and mortgagees, but also licensees, bankruptcy trustees, and
bankrupt debtors.62 This divergent economic and legal backdrop should
color the interpretation of the antiquated nineteenth-century language of
section 261 of the Patent Act.
C

Secured Transactions:Progeny of the IndustrialRevolution

State law normally governs the use of personal property to back
security interests. Section 261 of the Patent Act declares that patents
are personal property." Today, it is typical for personal property assets
such as stocks and bonds, art, antiques, and jewelry to be used as
collateral to support a loan from a secured creditor. 5 It is also widely
accepted that both title and possession of such personal property assets
remain in the debtor during the loan period. 6 Normally, title and
possession are only transferred to a secured creditor upon default of a
loan obligation.67 This was not always the case in American financing
law. 68

58. 35 U.S.C. §261 (2000).
59. See infra pp. 11-20.
60.
61.

See GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 438 (5th ed. 2007).
See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TABLE OF ANNUAL U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY

SINCE 1790, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/hcounts.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2009). Ten years after the first Patent Act, forty-one patent applications were filed. Id. In 2008,
almost 500,000 patent applications were filed with the PTO. Id.
62.

FAGERBERG & MOWERY, supranote 33, at 201.

63. U.C.C.
64. Id.

§ 9-109

(1995).

65. See JOHN E. ADAMSON, LAW FOR BUSINESS AND PERSONAL USE 557-58 (17th ed. 2006).

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. RICHARD F. DUNCAN & WILLIAM H. LYONS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: WORKING WITH ARTICLE 9, at 1-4 (19th ed. 2004).
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Until the early 1800s, using personal property as collateral required
the debtor to relinquish possession of the collateral to the secured
creditor until repayment of the loan obligation, while legal title remained
in the debtor.6 9 This type of financing transaction was called a "pledge,"
and it was the only way to legally use personal property, as opposed to
real property, as collateral.70 If possession was not transferred to the
secured creditor, the law considered the transaction a fraud.7' The issue
was that there would be no public notice of the secured creditor's
interest in the debtor's property as collateral if the creditor did not
physically possess the property.72 Courts feared that without public
notice, a debtor could sell the property to an innocent purchaser, or use
the property as collateral from yet another creditor who innocently
believed that the property was free of other lien interests.
The Industrial Revolution changed the landscape for security
interests.74 It created an abundant need for credit in order to finance the
rapid rate of growth of industrial facilities. It also created an economy
in which wealth existed not just in land, but also in personal property
such as factory equipment and stock-in-trade. 6 Thus, creditors were
forced to find collateral in personal property as well as real property to
secure their loans.n Pledges did not work because business owners
needed their factory equipment or stock-in-trade to run their businesses

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See GILMORE, supranote 60, at 438.
73. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 438.
74. See GILMORE, supranote 60, at 25. See infra text accompanying note 75.
75. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25. During the Industrial Revolution, there was an
unprecedented growth of industrial facilities and an equally rapid growth of the need for credit to
support this rapid expansion. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25. Banks demanded security for
their loans. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25. Unfortunately, the existing methods of security
were inadequate. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25. Using a mortgage on real property was not
enough to support the industrialist's insatiable demand for credit and the bank's demands for
security. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25. The pledge was also inadequate to support the
demand for credit. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25. One could pledge shares and bonds in the
company because a debtor could give the creditor possession of the certificates, however, one could
not pledge their factory equipment or railroad stock to support additional credit because the
company required possession of such tangibles for the operation of their business (refer to the
discussion on p. 13 for why pledges require the creditor to possess the collateral). See GILMORE,
supra note 60, at 25. This created the need for a new method of security by which one could use the
physical equipment and supplies within their business to back a loan, but not be required to give up
possession of such equipment and supplies. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25. This is the
backdrop of the development of the law of security interests in personal property.
76. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25.
77. See GILMORE, supranote 60, at 25.
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in order to repay the loan.18 Thus, despite the historical mistrust of
nonpossessory liens on personal property, the use of personal property as
nonpossessory collateral became widely accepted and modem day
security interest law was born.
The first nonpossessory security interest in personal property was
called a "chattel mortgage."80 Chattel mortgages were created by
statute, so-called "chattel mortgage acts," beginning in the 1820S.81 The
statute made nonpossessory security interests in personal property void
against bona fide purchasers and sometimes creditors unless the
mortgage was filed with the local recording office. 82 Recording would,
Still, it took
thus, provide public notice of nonpossessory interests.
interests in
security
most of the nineteenth century for nonpossessory
personal property to be accepted by the courts because of the concern of
fraudulent conveyances.84 Even in the 1850s, some courts considered
chattel mortgage to be presumptively fraudulent, even if a creditor
complied fully with the chattel mortgage act.
D.

OriginsofIntangible PersonalPropertyFinancingLaw

The historical background of secured transactions in intangible
personal property is key to understanding the context in which the Patent
Act's recording provision was enacted because it colors the
interpretation of the text and congressional intent at the time the statute
was written. There is a caveat within the history of patents in financing
law-not only is a patent considered personal property, it is an
intangible. Intangible property is property that lacks physical form.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, real and personal property

78. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25.
79. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25.
80. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 25.
81. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 26.
82. Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Federal Law: A National
Imperative, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 195, 212 (2001).
83. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 26.
84. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 27.
85. See GILMORE, supranote 60, at 26-27.
86. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216. Intangibles encompass a wide variety of legal interests
and assets, including accounts receivables, contract rights, and intellectual property such as patents.
Brennan, supra note 82, at 216. Certain types of intangibles that were represented by a written
document, such as corporate securities, were eventually allowed financing through the pledge upon
delivery of possession of the written document to the creditor. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216.
However, many intangibles, like intellectual property, could not be pledged. Brennan, supra note
82, at 216.
87.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 879 (9th ed. 2009).
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developed roughly in parallel with respect to recording provisions
through real property recording acts and the chattel mortgage acts."
But, there was a gap in the law regarding intangible personal property.89
During the initial adoption of state chattel mortgage acts during the
nineteenth century, chattel mortgage acts were limited to only tangible
property so the recording provisions of the acts were not available for
intangible personal property.9 0 Subsequently, liens on certain types of
intangibles were gradually allowed to receive protection under the
recording scheme set-up by the chattel mortgage act.9' Still, many
intangibles could not be pledged, including patents.92 Periodically
certain intangibles were made the subject of federal recording acts. 9 3 In
this context, Congress enacted the recording provision of the Patent Act
to provide a federal notice-filing system for patents-a federally created
intangible personal property right. 94
E. Modern Day Secured Transactions:The Uniform Commercial
Code to the Rescue
In the 1930s, in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, many
businessmen and lawyers began complaining that the lack of consistency
in state statutory laws regarding security interests in personal property
was creating significant problems.95 In 1944, at the tail end of World
War II, the National Conference and the American Law Institute began
work on a comprehensive review of state statutory law regarding
commercial transactions." In 1952, the first official version of the UCC
was released.
Article 9 of the UCC governs the method by which a secured
creditor must perfect a security interest.98 Perfection of a security
interest is required to establish a priority date against the claims of other
88. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216.
89. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216.
90. Brennan, supranote 82, at 216.
91. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216. Negotiable instruments and corporate securities were
eventually given protection under chattel mortgage acts. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216.
92. Brennan, supranote 82, at 216.
93. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216. For example, the trust receipt, an intangible, was made
the subject of the Uniform Trust Receipt Act in the early Twentieth century, providing a noticefiling system for financiers who used trust receipts to secure their loans. Brennan, supra note 82, at
216.
94. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216.
95. DUNCAN & LYONS, supra note 68, at 1-4.
96. DUNCAN & LYONS, supra note 68, at 1-5.
97. DUNCAN & LYONS, supranote 68, at 1-5.
98. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001).
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creditors. 99 Article 9 was created for two purposes: (1) to provide public
notification of the encumbered collateral to subsequent purchasers and
creditors, and (2) to establish priority in the event that the encumbered
collateral becomes part of a bankrupt estate in a bankruptcy
proceeding.' 0 All states have adopted the UCC in one form or another.
In order to perfect a security interest under the UCC, a creditor must file
a financing statement with the state of the debtor.' 0 '
F.

After-acquiredPropertyInterests: Now Owned or Hereafter
Acquired

Another caveat that developed in modem-day security interest law
is the after-acquired property interest.10 2 Under Article 9, section 204, a
debtor and secured creditor may enter into an agreement that collateral
for a loan includes not only properties currently owned by the debtor,
but also certain properties acquired after the date of the security
agreement.10 3 For example, in a typical scenario, inventor A, owner of
patent 1, and lender B enter into a security agreement in which collateral
includes "all the debtor's general intangibles now owned or hereafter
acquired."'"0 Subsequently, inventor A uses the loan from lender B to
finance the development of a new medical technology. Inventor A then
files for a patent application for this new medical technology, patent 2.
Lender B now owns a security interest in both patent 1 and patent 2,
without having to file another security agreement. 05 This type of
security interest is called a "floating lien," because it "floats" over the
99. Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1657; U.C.C. §9-204 (1995).
100. Thomas M. Ward, The Perfection and PriorityRules for Security Interests in Copyrights,
Patents, and Trademarks: The CurrentStructural Dissonance andProposed Legislative Cures, 53
ME. L. REv. 391, 396-97 (2001).
101. Stevens, supra note 32, at 6-7. The financing statement required under the UCC is fairly
simple, requiring only a general description of the covered collateral, while the federal system
requires a separate filing for each patent. Intellectual PropertySecurity Registrationand the Report
of the US. Copyright Office on Copyright and Digital Distance Education: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Propertyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 144
(1999) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Susan Barbieri Montgomery, attorney at law, Foley,
Hoag & Eliot, LLP, and G. Larry Engel, on behalf of the American Bar Association). This is
cumbersome because a secured transaction agreement often uses as collateral "all general
intangibles," which includes all existing intangibles owned by a company and any future intangibles
thereafter created or acquired by said company. Id.
102. DUNCAN & LYONS, supra note 68, at 2-39.
103. DUNCAN & LYoNs, supra note 68, at 2-39.
104. See DUNCAN & LYONS, supranote 68, at 2-39.
105. See generally supra text accompanying note 101 (discussing the UCC filing system that
requires only a general description of the collateral, which can encompass all existing intangibles
currently owned as well as any future intangibles acquired by a debtor).
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debtor's current and future assets.'06 Although floating liens are
recognized by the UCC, the PTO does not recognize floating liens as a
security interest in a patent. 07 Even if the PTO recognized floating
liens, it would be practically difficult because filing in the PTO requires
a patent number.'08 Therefore, a secured creditor would need to monitor
a debtor's inventions and file with the PTO for each after-acquired
patent interest. 1
G. Article 9 and Section 261, Meet Bankruptcy Law

The answer to whether federal or state filings are required to perfect
security interests in patents can be critical to bankruptcy proceedings. 0
Of particular importance is what rights secured creditors have against
Upon filing for bankruptcy, an insolvent
bankruptcy trustees."'
corporation appoints a bankruptcy trustee, a fiduciary whose duty is to
settle the affairs of the bankrupt estate, including settling creditor
claims." 2 Federal bankruptcy law gives the trustee status as a
"hypothetical lien creditor" in order to gain priority status so as to avoid
certain security interests."' Bankruptcy law further provides that a
trustee, on behalf of the bankrupt estate, may avoid any of the
corporation's transfers of property interest made by the corporation on or
within 90 days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 1 4 Because
security interests generally become effective on the date of perfection,
the legal date of perfection in a security interest can be very critical to
determining whether a security interest transaction falls within the
ninety-day preferential period, and thereby can be avoided by a

106. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 359. A floating lien may change on a daily basis, for
example, when existing inventory is sold and new inventory acquired. Kathleen Payne, Drafting
Pointersfor Success, MICH. BAR J., at 28 (2005). The lien is "floating" because the collateral may
change according to what is sold and/or newly acquired. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 359.
107. Hearings,supra note 101, at 144 (statement of Susan Barbieri Montgomery).
108. Hearings, supra note 101, at 144. The PTO requires that filing of security interests in
patents be tied to the specific patent and patent application numbers by the cover sheet under which
the filing is made. Stevens, supra note 32, at § 7. Therefore, filing a general description of the
"floating" collateral with the PTO would not be helpful because the PTO requires that each patent
be individually identified. See id.; infra Part II.A.3 (discussing legislative history).
109. Hearings,supranote 101, at 144.
110. See supra p. 1.
111. See Toren et al., supranote 3, at 201.
112. Carlos J. Cuevas, Bankruptcy Code Section 544 (A) and Constructive Trusts: The
Trustee's Strong Arm Powers Should Prevail,21 SETON HALL L. REv. 678,731 (1991).
113. Id.
114. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4) (West 2007).
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trustee." 5 In fact, in the past few decades there have been an increasing
number of bankruptcy cases dealing with the issue of whether filing
under the PTO or the UCC constitutes perfection in a patent in order to
defeat a bankruptcy trustee's claim.' 16
III. PATENT PERFECTION: PATENT ACT OR UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE?

A.

Statutory Interpretation
1. Historical Textual Analysis of Section 261: An Uneasy Task

To find the meaning and scope of section 261 of the Patent Act, a
court must first look to the text of the statute." 7 Before analyzing the
text, a court must determine what historical context the language was
written in.'ts This is not always an easy task, especially when there have
been multiples amendments, as is the case of section 261."9 The first
recording provision for the Patent Act was enacted in section four of the
Patent Act of 1793.120 It included the idea that an inventor could
"assign" his interest in a patent and subsequently the assignee was
required to record with the office in order "to stand in the place of the
Thus, the statute's recording provision and
original inventor."'21
"assignment" language was first enacted in 1793.122 However, the
Patent Act of 1836 added the language that "grants" and "conveyances"
of exclusive rights to a patent shall also be recorded.123 It could be
argued that the word "assignment" should be analyzed according to its
meaning in the eighteenth century and that words "grant" and
"'conveyance" should be analyzed according to the mid-nineteenth
century meaning.

115. See, e.g., Braunstein v. Gateway Mgmt. Servs. (In re Coldwave Sys., LLC), 368 B.R. 91,
92-94 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007).
116. See, e.g., Coldwave Sys., 368 B.R. at 92; In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039,
1039 (9th Cir. 2001); City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 780 (D. Kan.
1988); In re Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 637 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
117. See Robert H. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court
Says, 34 A.B.A. 535, 537-38 (1948). If ambiguities arise, it may be helpful to determine
congressional intent behind the provision through legislative history. Id.
118. See CyberneticServs., 252 F.3d at 1049.
119. See supra pp. 9-10.
120. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, §4, 1 Stat. 318-323 (1793).
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
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On the other hand, some view the year 1870 as the relevant
historical context because it was the year the current language of section
261 was enacted.124 It was also the year in which Congress added the
idea that assignments, grants, and conveyances were "void as against
any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee" unless recorded in the PTO. 25
Because key words of the statute were added by different congresses
over the span of 100 years, identifying a narrow time period in which to
focus the textual analysis is difficult, if not impossible.12 6 This is
especially troublesome, given that the 100-year span encompassed great
change in American economic and legal history with the advent of the
Industrial Revolution.127
In Cybernetic Services, the Ninth Circuit declared that the words of
the statute must be given their meaning in 1870.128 Accordingly, to
support the idea that section 261 deals only with transfers of title, the
Ninth Circuit cited various nineteenth-century and early twentiethcentury cases. 12 9 The court cited cases and secondary sources from 1883
to 1929 to support the proposition that an "assignment" was a transfer of
the patent's title.13 0 The court cited an 1868 case explaining that a
"grant" must convey all exclusive rights to a patent within a specified

124. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2001).
125. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 36, 16 Stat. 203 (1870).
126. The Patent Act of 1793 stated, in relevant part, that it an inventor can "assign the title and
interest in the said invention... and the assignee having recorded said assignment.. shall thereafter
stand in the place of the original inventor, both as to right and responsiblity." Patent Act of 1793,
Ch. 11, § 4, 1 Stat. 318-23 (1793) (emphasis added). In 1836, the language was amended such that
any "assignment, and also every grant and conveyance of the exclusive right under any
patent...shall be recorded in the Patent Office." Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117
(1836) (emphasis added). In 1870 the language was further amended, stating that "every patent
shall be assignable.. .and the patentee or his assign may.. grantand convey an exclusive right under
his patent.. .and said assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaseror mortgagee." Patent Act of 1870, Ch. 230, § 36, 16 Stat. 198-217 (1870) (emphasis
added). The word "assignment" was first written into the statute in 1793. Patent Act of 1793, Ch.
11, § 4, 1 Stat. 318-23 (1793). The words "grant" and "conveyance" were added approximately
forty years later. Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). And the words "purchaser"
and "mortgagee" were added thirty years later. Patent Act of 1870, Ch. 230, § 36, 16 Stat. 198-217
(1870). Should we analyze each word according to its legal meaning at the time of its insertion into
the Patent Act?
127. See GILMORE, supranote 60, at 438; supra Part 11(summarizing the history of the Patent
Act and the law of security interests in personal property).
128. CyberneticSerys., 252 F.3d at 1049. Section 261 is derived from the Patent Act of 1870,
ch. 230, §36, 16 Stat. 203.
129. Id. at 1049-50.
130. Id. (citing Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75, 82-83 (1883); Waterman v.
Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891); WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS § 762, at 517
(1890); 48 C.J. Patents§ 390, at 253 (1929)).
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geographic area,' 3 ' coupled with a 1949 case, which stated that grants
and assignments differ only in that grants pertain to a limited geographic
area.13 2 Thus, grants are title transfers limited to rights within a specific
The Ninth Circuit admitted that the word
geographic area.133
"conveyance" historically had varied meanings, but cited to an 1860
case that gave it the meaning of title transfer from one person to
another.' 34 The court seemed to portray the definitions of the
aforementioned words with unwarranted confidence as unambiguous;
however, the meanings of the words are far from plain, particularly in
such complex contexts as security interests in intangible personal
property and in light of the rapid evolution of the law in this area during
the evolving enactment of section 261.
In the early 1800s, the only security interests that existed were
mortgages for real property and pledges for personal property. 3 6 After
chattel mortgage acts were enacted by state legislatures, beginning in the
1820s, pledges were gradually considered valid, even without delivery
of possession to the creditor, as long as notice was provided by
recording the creditor's interest with the state recording office.'3" At
38
early common law the law of assignments governed intangibles.'

131. Id. (citing Moore v. Marsh, 74 U.S. 515, 521 (1868)).
132. Id. (citing Houdry Process Corp. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 87 F. Supp. 547, 552 (D.
Del. 1949)).
133. Id. (citing Houdry Process Corp., 87 F. Supp. at 552).
134. Id. (citing Abendroth v. Town of Greenwich, 29 Conn. 356 (1860); Frame v. Bivens, 189
F. 785, 789 (C.C.E.D. Okla. 1909); I BOuVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 361 (14th ed. 1874); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933)). However, each of these sources uses "conveyance" in a real
property setting, not with respect to personal property or intangible property. Abendroth, 29 Conn.
at 356 (stating that conveyance is a transfer of title from one person to another, but involving real
estate claims); Frame, 189 F. at 789 (stating that "conveyance" is the transfer of title of land from
one person to another) (emphasis added); I BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 361 (defining
"conveyance" as the transfer of title of land from one person to another); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY ("In a strict legal sense, a transfer of legal title to land.").The court admitted that the
term "conveyance" was not typically used in the context of intangible property and that "its historic
meaning tended to vary," but did not state what other variations upon the meaning of the word
"conveyance" there were, historically. CyberneticServs., 252 F.3d at 1050.
135. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at § 2.8, 58-60. Mr. Gilmore noted that many of the late
nineteenth century and earlier twentieth century cases dealing with mortgages of intangible property
used language "that wobble[d] from mortgage to pledge to assignment." GILMORE, supra note 60,
at § 2.8, 58-60. Yet, the debtor of a pledge transaction retained title to the collateral, unlike a
traditional mortgage. Supra pp. 14-15.
136. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 24. A pledge required delivery of the collateral to the
creditor, otherwise the transaction was considered fraudulent. Supra p. 12.
137. See GILMORE, supranote 60, at § 2.8, 58-60.
138. Brennan, supranote 82, at 216.
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Perhaps for that reason, courts often confused, and interchangeably used,
the words "assignment" and "pledge."' 39
In 1849, the New York Court of Appeals stated that "debts and
[intangibles] are capable, by written assignment, of being conveyed in
pledge." 4 0 Because a pledge is essentially a lien without title transfer,
the court's statement suggests that security interests in intangibles, such
as patents, can by "assigned" and/or "conveyed," under the legal
meaning of the words. Therefore, the Patent Act's requirement that
"assignments" and "conveyances" of patents must be recorded could
very well be interpreted as including the assignment and conveyance of
security interests.' 4' Conjointly, because at early common law,
intangibles were governed by the law of assignments,142 a court could
envision why Congress used the word "assignment" to indicate a transfer
of patent rights in the Patent Act of 1793-a reason that did not
necessarily intend to limit recordation to title transfers, but rather
express recordation in accordance with the law of intangibles, i.e. the
law of assignments. 43
In fact, as assignments of intangibles came to be recognized, they
The basic
were accorded the name "collateral assignments."'"
difference between so-called collateral assignments and true assignments
was that collateral assignments gave the debtor the right of redemption,
whereas, true assignments did not give the debtor this right of
redemption.145 Thus, the term "assignments" does not necessarily
preclude secured transactions.
139. See GILMORE, supra note 60, at 10; Wilson v. Little, 2 N.Y. 443, 446 (1849).
140. Wilson, 2 N.Y. at 446 (emphasis added).
141. In other words, section 261 of the Patent Act states that "[a]pplications for patents,
patents, and any interesttherein, shall be assignable." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). Security interests in
patents qualify under the plain meaning of "any interest therein." Id. A legal right to patent title
upon failure to repay a debt is certainly an interest in a patent. Section 261 goes on to state that
"assignments, grants, and conveyances" must be recorded with the PTO in order to provide notice.
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). It follows that an assignment, grant or conveyance of a security interest is
covered by section 261. See id. And we know that during the mid-nineteenth century a "debt and
[intangibles]," such as intellectual property security interests, could be assigned and conveyed. See
GILMORE, supranote 60, at 10; Wilson, 2 N.Y. at 446. Thus, section 261 does not exclude security
interests in patents from its protection. See generally id.
142. Brennan, supranote 82, at 216. See also GILMORE, supranote 60, at 55-56.
143. In other words, Congress may have used the word "assignment" because the common law
of assignments governed intangibles, such as patent interests. Thus, use of the word "assignment"
may not have been intended to limit recording to title transfers, but to indicate the law of
assignments in governing patent rights.
144. See GILMORE, supranote 60, at 200-10.
145. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216. The right of redemption gives a mortgagee the right to
retain the mortgaged property by paying off the defaulted mortgage. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
1390 (9th ed. 2009).
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Furthermore, many courts used language that "wobble[d] from
mortgage to pledge to assignment," when discussing security interests in
intangibles.146 Other courts treated security transfers of intangibles as
mortgages, not subject to the chattel mortgage act, but rather subject to
the right of redemption according to the title or lien theory under
relevant state law.' 4 1 Clearly, during the nineteenth-century enactment
of the recording provision of the Patent Act, clear lines were not drawn
between the terms "assignment", "pledge", "conveyance", and
"mortgage with respect to intangible personal property." Thus, it is
difficult to conclude wholeheartedly, like the Ninth Circuit did in
Cybernetic Services, that there is a plain meaning to the words
"assignment," "grant," and "conveyance" within section 261 of the
Patent Act.
The Ninth Circuit argued that because Congress did not use the
word "pledge," it did not intend the recording provision of the Patent
Act to include security interests because the pledge was a common
method of using patents as collateral.14 8 However, as mentioned
above,149 there is authority declaring that pledges were not used for
intangibles, but rather the law of assignments was used for security
interests in intangibles.so
146. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 58-60 (citing Tuttle v. Blow, 75 S.W. 697 (Ky. Ct. App.
1903); Dearman v. Cottrell, 261 Ala. 502 (1954); Webster v. Indus. Acceptance Corp., 28 S.W.2d
959 (1930)). In Tuttle, the Missouri court upheld a security transfer of a trademark and a secret
formula for the trademarked product. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 58-60. In Dearman,the Alabama
court upheld a "mortgage" on a partnership interest. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 53-60. The
question was whether a transferee's interest could be foreclosed against the partnership assets.
GILMORE, supra note 60, at 58-60. In Webster, a "mortgage" of an heir's interest in his father's
estate was recorded and held valid against a creditor whether the transaction was considered an
"assignment" or a "mortgage," a point not decided by the court. GILMORE, supranote 60, at 58-60.
147. Brennan, supra note 82, at 216 (citing GILMORE, supra note 60, at 58-60 (citing Gilmore
v. Morris, 60 Am. Rep. 85 (1885), Livermore Falls Trust & Banking Co. v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 79
Atl. 844 (1911))). In Gilmore v. Morris, the debtor of a secured transaction sold the intangible
collateral, stocks, on default and the creditor sued for conversion. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 58
n.l 1. If the transaction was a pledge Alabama law allowed a lifetime to redeem, however, if the
transaction was a mortgage a six-year statute of limitations applied. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 58
n. 11. The court declined to determine whether the secured transaction of the intangible collateral
was a pledge or mortgage. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 58 n.l 1. Instead, the court held that the
claim was barred by the statute of limitations if it was a mortgage; by laches if it was a pledge.
GILMORE, supra note 60, at 58 n. 11. In Livermore Falls Trust & Banking Co., a creditor possessed
a mortgage of the plant, tools, inventory, and receivables of a manufacturing company. GILMORE,
supra note 60, at 58 n.12. The court would only apply the chattel mortgage act to the chattel; and
the intangibles, i.e. account receivables, would fall under the law of pledges or equitable
assignments. GILMORE, supranote 60, at 58 n.12.
148. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. 2001).
149. See suprap. 26.
150. Brennan, supranote 82, at 216.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

19

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 5 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 2

298

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[5:279

The Ninth Circuit also looked at the historical meaning of the
words "purchaser" and "mortgagee" in order to determine what parties
section 261 protected."' The court used early twentieth-century sources
to find that a mortgagee was one who obtained title to property in order
to secure a debt and a purchaser, i.e. a bona fide purchaser, took title
without notice for value.' 52 Nevertheless, a court could find that section
261 also protects secured creditors upon further examination of the
historical use of the words "mortgagee" and "purchaser." There are
numerous cases that support the validity of the "lien patent mortgage,"
which does not transfer title to the mortgagee, but rather leaves title of
the patent in the mortgagor. 53
For example, in 1904 in the case of Ormsby v. Conners, a patent
owner made a security transfer in a patent, timely recorded with the
PTO.154 The patent owner retained the exclusive rights to use, sell, and
make the invention, i.e. title.'55 The circuit said that the patent owner
"transferred the patent as collateral security, or as in the way of a
mortgage; it makes no difference which."' 6 Clearly, the court viewed
the security transfer of the patent as a mortgage, even if the transaction
did not transfer title.'57 The court recognized a secured transaction in
which title was retained in the mortgagor and not transferred to the
mortgagee.' 58 Thus, early twentieth-century case law supports the
proposition that security interests in patents that did not transfer title
were also considered mortgages.' 5 9 It follows that the Patent Act's use
of the word "mortgagee" does not exclude secured creditors from the list
of those protected by recordation with the PTO under section 261.
2. Canons of Construction to Clarify Legislative Intent
The Ninth Circuit argued that the heading of section 261,
"ownership; assignments," suggests that the provision only applies to

151. Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1052-53.
152. Id.
153. Brennan, supra note 82, at 232-37 (summarizing several lien patent mortgage cases
decided in the early 1900s). See, e.g., Ormsby v. Conners, 133 F. 548 (Cir. Mass. 1904);
Transducer Patents Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 492 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1974); Westmoreland Specialty
Co. v. Hogan, 167 F. 327 (3d Cir. 1909).
154. Ormsby, 133 F. at 548.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 549.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 550.
159. Id at 549.
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ownership rights in patents and assignments of ownership rights. 60
However, the court does so without any explanation or reasoning as to
this textual interpretation.' 6 1 Compare the Ninth Circuit's assumptions
regarding the heading with a 1952 Senate Committee hearing report,
which summarizes section 261 as "relatling] to assignments and
ownership."l 6 2 This wording used by the Senate Committee suggests
that the use of a semi-colon in the heading, between ownership and
assignment, is not meant to limit "assignments" to only assignments of
ownership. The Senate report's use of the conjunction "and," in addition
to the placement of the word "assignment" before the word "ownership,"
suggests that the 82nd Congress regarded assignments and ownerships
as two separate and independent categories, both under section 261, and
not a hierarchy in which the overriding category is ownership, and
assignments, a mere subcategory.163 Moreover, semicolons are properly
used to join two independent clauses, not to indicate a dependent clause
following an independent clause.' 6" There is no support from the
heading that section 261 is limited to only ownership rights, as the Ninth
Circuit suggests.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that courts should not
interpret the text so as to render the statute meaningless or absurd.'
The Ninth Circuit declared that section 261 governed only transfers of
title.166 However, if a security interest can be a transfer of title then the
Ninth Circuit's declaration that section 261 does not apply to security
interests 67 does not follow reason. Admittedly, security transfers are
often considered liens, but this is not exclusively the case. A security
interest may be either a lien or a title transfer.16 8 In fact, Article 9 covers
any transaction intending to create a security interest, regardless of
whether there is a title transfer or not.' 69 Thus, to void an absurd result,
it follows that the scope of section 261 should not exclude security
interests.
Another well-known canon of construction states that a statute must
be construed so as to give meaning and effect to the statute's underlying

160.
161.
162.
163.

In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001).
See id.
S. Rep. No. 1979, at S (1952).
The 82nd Congress wrote the 1952 senate committee hearing report. Id. at 1.

164.

WILLIAM STRUNK JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 5-6 (4th ed. 2000).

165. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
166. Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1059.
167. Id.
168. Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1752 n.7.
169. Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1752 n.7.
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Indeed, this requires that a court "ascertain the
purpose.1 70
[1]egislature's intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute." 17
One of the primary purposes of the Patent Act's recording provision is to
prevent fraud by providing public notice of property interests in a
patent." 2 With the current state of ambiguity over whether recordation
with the PTO only protects "subsequent purchasers or mortgagees"
without notice, or whether federal filing also protects lienholders, fraud
is much more likely."' The ambiguity leaves secured creditors in a very
unsecure position, caught between state and federal law.' 74 Decisions
falling in line with the dicta of In re Transportation Design and
Technology, Inc."I7 make it impossible for a secured creditor to protect
itself against a subsequent purchaser.' 76 Creditors cannot protect their
interests in a patent against subsequent purchasers under the UCC
because the UCC governs rights as between creditors, not against
owners.17 7 And creditors cannot protect their security interests against
subsequent purchasers under federal law, because, following cases like
In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc. and Cybernetic
Services, federal registration only protects titleholders who record in the
PTO, not lienholders.' 7 Thus, if section 261 is interpreted to protect
only titleholders, creditors are left without recourse and such a gap
would provide an avenue for fraudulent opportunists. Section 261
should be interpreted to give meaning and effect to the purpose
underlying the statute-to protect good faith actors against fraudulent
conveyances.179
3. Legislative History: Industry in Favor of the UCC's
Streamlined System
On June 24, 1999, a hearing was held before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property regarding registration of secured

170.

FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 21

(2009).
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
required
176.
177.
178.
179.

Smith v. Super. Ct., 39 Cal. 4th 77, 83 (2006).
Brennan, supranote 82, at 236.
See Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1655.
Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1655.
Infra note 191 (giving examples of cases in which the court held that only state filing is
to perfect a security interest in a patent as between two lienholders).
Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1655.
Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1655.
See Haemmerli, supranote 19, at 1655.
See CROSS, supra note 170, at 21.
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transactions of intellectual property. 80 A representative spoke on behalf
of the American Bar Association (ABA), urging Congress to allow UCC
filings with the state to perfect security interests in intellectual property
as between secured lenders and debtors, while limiting the scope of
federal filings to establish priorities as compared to subsequent transfers
of ownership interests. 8 ' The ABA listed several reasons for its
recommendation.18 2 The first reason listed was that federal filings do
not allow for floating liens, making it necessary to file separately for
each current and subsequent piece of intellectual property."' On the
other hand, state filings under the UCC can be done by general
descriptions of the covered collateral, much less burdensome on the
lending community.184 The ABA exclaimed that "[a]fter decades of
encouragement from commercial users, the UCC filings and search
reporting systems are comparatively quick and cost effective to use" as
compared with the federal filing system.*85
The ABA noted that because financiers calculate the amount of
credit they could extend to a particular borrower against the reliable
value of their perfected collateral, ambiguity about intellectual property
collateral unnecessarily reduces the amount of financing available for
intellectual property owners.' 8 6 In November 1999 and again in 2002,
both Houses passed and the President signed amendments to the Patent
Act, yet none of the amendments included any changes to the language
of section 261.187 It is obvious that Congress was both aware of this
issue and knew how to correct it, as evidenced by the subcommittee
180. Hearings,supranote 101, at 1.
181. Hearings, supranote 101, at 144 (statement of Susan Barbieri Montgomery).
182. Hearings,supra note 101, at 144.
183. Hearings,supranote 101, at 144. See suprap. 20.
184. Hearings,supranote 101, at 144. Additionally, the UCC only requires filing in one state,
not every state that the debtor does business. Hearings,supra note 101, at 143.
185. Hearings, supra note 101, at 143. Another issue of concern is the sluggish nature of the
current patent system. Stevens, supra note 32, at n.156 (2005). Financial transactions are often very
time-sensitive. Stevens, supra note 32, at n.156. However, the PTO's database of patent and patent
application filings is "badly outdated." Stevens, supra note 32, at n.156. A related issue is that
even if a bank searched the PTO records for a filing of interests against a patent, the bank may not
find all of the effective transfers because section 261 permits unrecorded transfers to be effective, as
long as they are filed within three months. Stevens, supra note 32, at n. 156. In the financial world
three months is a long time to validate a single piece of collateral, thereby increasing transaction
costs and decreasing the value of patents. See Stevens, supra note 32, at n.156; Hearings,supra
note 101, at 143, 146 (noting the importance of prompt and efficient determination of title in
intellectual property).
186. Hearings,supra note 2101, at 143, 146.
187. American Inventor's Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113; Intellectual Property
and High Technology Technical Amendments Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 17571922.
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meeting discussed above and by the fact that Congress amended the
Copyright Act in 1976 to require federal filing of security interests in
copyrighted works.'88 Why, then, did Congress not choose to do the
same for the Patent Act?
Most of the federal bankruptcy cases and the Ninth Circuit agree
that only state registration is required for perfection of security interests
in patents as between two lienholders.1 89 By its inaction, Congress may
be either deferring to the courts to decide the issue, or intending to
maintain the status quo.' 90 Either way, congressional silence swings the
pendulum towards state filings because it appears to be the current state
of the law according to the federal bankruptcy courts and the Ninth
Circuit.1'9
In summary, because the law regarding security interests in
intangible personal property, like patents, was evolving during the
enactment and amendments of the Patent Act's recording provision, the
plain meaning of the text is subject to multiple interpretations. Such
ambiguity gives rise to the use of canons of construction as intrinsic
guides as to the legislature's intent. 192 The canons of construction
mentioned in this comment, as articulated above, point to the idea that
secured transactions should be included in the federal registration system
and creditors should be protected under the same. Nevertheless, analysis
of modem-day legislative intent suggests that Congress is deferring to
the current state of the law, which leans firmly towards allowing
perfection of security interests in patents by state registration.

188. R. Scott Griffin, A MalpracticeSuit Waiting to Happen: The Conflict between Perfecting
Security Interests in Patentsand Copyrights (aNote on Peregrine,Cybernetic, and Their Progeny),
20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 765, 781 (2004). The Copyright Act was revised in 1976 to explicitly
provide for federal registration of security interests as liens in order to perfect security interests in
copyrights. See Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1665-66. The Copyright Act was created under the
same constitutional provision as the Patent Act. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Therefore, Congress
was familiar with the idea of explicitly providing for the federal registration of security interests in
intellectual property statutes, however, it has yet to do so for patents. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc.,
252 F.3d 1039, 1056 (9th Cir. 2001).
189. See, e.g., In re Transp. Design & Tech., Inc. 48 B.R. 635, 638 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985);
Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1059; City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 33 B.R. 780, 784
(D. Kan. 1988).
190. It is clear that Congress knows both how to update the recording provision language and
that security interests in intellectual property are at issue. Supra pp. 34-35. Therefore, Congress
must be either deferring or is satisfied with the current state of the law. Supra pp. 34-35.
191. See, e.g., Transp. Design & Tech., 48 B.R. at 638; Cybernetic Serys., 252 F.3d at 1059;
City Bank and Trust Co., 83 BR. at 784.
192. Ki Se Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).
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4. Proper Role of the Courts: Law, Not Policy
With such conflicting sources of persuasion, what is a court to do?
Justice Holmes once stated that the judiciary's job is not "to inquire what
the legislature means, we only ask what the statute means."' 93 In other
words, it is the language of the text that is approved by both Houses and
the President, not legislative intent.' 94 In any case, there is arguably no
such a thing as a single unified "legislative intent," as congressional
intent changes vastly over time and members of Congress have different
reasons for passing a statute, some of which may have nothing to do
with the statute itself.195
Although the concerns of the ABA and industry provide great
policy arguments for state filings,19 the courts must honor the text of the
statute.' 97 The judiciary must only ask "what the statute means," not
"what the legislature means."' 98 Under textual analysis and use of
cannons of construction, the language of the text supports a federal
registration system for security interests in patents.'99
B.

FederalPreemption or Coexistence?
1. Coexistence Promotes the Progress of Industry

If a court finds that a federal statute preempts a state statute, then,
under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, federal law controls. 2 00
Preemption of state law by federal law may occur by: (1) express
preemption, (2) conflict preemption, and (3) field preemption. 2 0 1
Express preemption occurs when the federal statute explicitly provides
that state law is preempted.202 If there is no express provision in the
statute itself, preemption may be implied through conflict or field

193. Robert H. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court
Says?, 34 A.B.A 535, 538 (1948) (addressing the American Law Institute on the continual conflict
on congressional intent based on the text of the statute versus what the Supreme Court says the
legislature meant or should've meant).
194. Id. at 535.
195. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930).
196. Supra pp. 33-34 (Part 1.A.3, analyzing legislative history).
197. Jackson, supra note 193, at 535.
198. Jackson, supra note 193, at 535.
199. Supra pp. 22-33 (Part III.A. 1-2, analyzing the text using historical meaning and analyzing
the text using cannons of construction).
200. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
201. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
202. See Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 701, 713 (1985).
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preemption by inferring congressional intent.203 Conflict preemption can
be found if there is either an (1) actual conflict, or (2) an obstacle. 2 04 An
actual conflict occurs when complying with state law would make it
impossible to comply with federal law. 205 Even if there is no actual
conflict, a court will find conflict preemption if complying with state law
would be an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress in
passing the federal law.206 Finally, even without express or conflict
preemption, a court may find field preemption if the scheme of federal
regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." 207
There is nothing in the Patent Act that explicitly provides for
federal preemption, so express preemption is not an issue here. 20 8 There
is no actual conflict, as evidenced by the fact that practitioners are
advised to file with both the state and the federal registration system to
perfect their security interests in patents. 2 09 There is no field preemption
because the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that state and federal
law can co-exist in the field of patent law, to the extent that state law
does not clash with the balance struck by Congress between inventor
incentives and public availability of inventive resources. 2 '0 The
Supreme Court has analyzed federal preemption with respect to patents
under conflict preemption via an obstacle.2 1' The Court, attempting to
maintain the balance struck by Congress between inventor incentives
and free competition, has struck down some state laws while upholding
others.212
In SearS213 and Compco, 2 14 both decided in 1964, the Supreme
Court struck down a state unfair competition law because it was an
203. Mass. Ass'n of HMO's v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1999).
204. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
205. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
206. Crosby v. Nat'1 Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
207. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 234,237 (1964); Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
208. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001).
209. Paige, supranote 31.
210. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152-55 (1989).
211. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. BicronCorp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974); Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Bonito
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 152-55.
212. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 479; Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262; Hines, 312 U.S. at 67;
Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 152-55.
213. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-32 (1964). Stiffel Co. was a lamp
manufacturer that had created a "pole lamp." Id. at 225-26. Soon after Stiffel Co. put the pole lamp
on the market Sears put a substantially identical lamp on the market. Id. at 226. Stiffel Co. sued
Sears for causing confusion in the trade as to the source of the lamps and thereby engaging in unfair
trade competition. Id. The district court enjoined Sears from making the lamps because Sears
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obstacle to the federal patent policies of free competition, no unlimited
monopolies in inventions, and preserving for the public inventions
already in the public domain. The policy behind the state law was to
prevent public confusion as to the source of a product. 215 Accordingly,
the lower courts enjoined the copying of an article, not protected under a
valid federal patent, because the copied article was similar enough in
appearance to the original maker's product so as to create a likelihood of
consumer confusion.2 16 Notwithstanding, both times, the Supreme Court
reversed the injunction in favor of free exploitation of publicly available
innovations not protected by the federal patent system. 2 17 Subsequent
decisions have proved much more deferential to state law.218
In Kewanee Oil Co., the Court looked at whether state trade secret
law was an obstacle to the federal patent regime. 2 19 The Court found it
competed unfairly with Stiffel Co. by making their lamps confusingly similar to Stiffel Co.'s. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lamp was already in the public domain and
unpatented, therefore Sears had a right to copy Stiffel Co.'s unprotected design under federal law.
Id. at 230-33. The Court suggests that if Stiffel Co. wanted a monopoly over their pole lamp they
were free to obtain a valid patent. Id. at 231. Federal patent policy is to promote invention while at
the same time preserving free competition. Id. at 230-31.
214. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Corp., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38. Day-Brite and
Compco were both fluorescent lighting fixtures manufacturers. Id. at 234-35. Day-Brite sued
Compco for unfair competition alleging that Compo copied Day-Brite's design for a particular
lighting fixture that Day-Brite created, thereby creating confusion in the industry as to the source of
the lighting fixture design. Id. at 235. The district court held that there was unfair competition and
enjoined Compco from copying Day-Brite's design. Id. However, the Supreme Court reversed
citing Sears v. Stiffel Co. and declaring that under federal law copying a design unprotected by
patent law is consistent with federal policy. Id. at 238-39.
215. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38. Traditionally, a state has the
right to impose liability on a company who, knowing that another company has a reputation for
quality products, deceives the public by making confusingly similar products and not labeling them
so that the source ofthe products are readily identifiable. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
216. Sears, 376 U.S. at 226; Compco, 376 U.S. at 235-36.
217. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33; Compco, 376 U.S. at 238-39. See text accompanying note 213
and note 214 (summarizing Sears and Compco, respectively). The Court cited to a 1938 case for its
support that free exploitation of publicly available goods supports the public good and the American
ideals of free competition. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33. 'Sharing in the good will of an article
unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all - and in the free
exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested in.' Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
218. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. BicronCorp., 416 U.S. 470, 491 (1974); Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 152-55 (1989).
219. 416 U.S. at 472. Kewanee Oil spent over $1 million in research to develop a synthetic
crystal. Id. at 470. Bicron obtained confidential information, i.e. trade secret information, regarding
the crystal-making process from a former Kewanee Oil employee who had breached his
confidentiality agreement with Kewanee Oil. Id. Kewanee Oil did not have a patent on the
synthetic crystal, but chose to protect the information through their own protective measures and
employee confidentiality agreements, consistent with trade secret law. Id. Kewanee Oil sued
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helpful to first identify the distinct objectives behind both patent law and
trade secret law. 22 0 The Court identified three objectives of federal
patent law: 1) offering inventor incentives through limited monopolies,
2) promoting public disclosure of inventions, and 3) prohibiting the
removal of inventions already in the public domain.221 The Court
identified two broad trade secret objectives: 1) maintaining standards
for commercial ethics and 2) encouraging innovation.2 22 Next, the Court
examined the interaction of trade secret and patent law to determine if
the federal objectives were thwarted.223
The Court determined that the only federal objective in danger of
224
Ultimately,
encroachment by trade secret law was public disclosure.
the Court decided that any encouragement, if any, that trade secret law
had towards keeping innovation a secret, rather than allowing public
disclosure, was greatly outweighed by the positive effects of trade secret
225
More importantly, trade secret law
law on industry and innovation.
did not divert inventors from seeking federal patent protection because
patent protection is much more superior to trade secret protection.226
Bicron for misappropriation of a trade secret. Id. The court of appeals found that Ohio's trade
secret law conflicted with federal patent law. Id. However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the trade secret law was not an obstacle to federal patent law. Id. at 493.
220. Kewanee Oil, Co., 416 U.S. at 480-82.
221. Id. The Court stated that the federal policy of encouraging invention through incentives is
not disturbed by the existence of another form of incentive, i.e. trade secret law. Id. at 484. The
Court stated that there is no risk of removing inventions from the public domain because a trade
secret by definition is not in the public domain. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 482.
224. Id. at 484. The Court identified three categories of trade secrets: (1) the trade secret
believed by its owner to be validly patentable; (2) the trade secret known to its owner not to be
patentable; and (3) the trade secret whose patent validity is doubtful to the owner. Id. In category
(2) an owner wouldn't disclose the secret to the PTO via a patent application because the owner
knows that it is not patentable so there is no conflict with the patent policy of disclosure. Id. In
categories (1) and (3) the owner could try to keep the invention a trade secret or try to patent it, but
the court decided that because patent protection is much stronger more likely than not an owner
would choose to patent the invention. Id. at 486-88. Finally, the Court noted that even if the
invention were not disclosed to the public there is a high probability that someone else will invent it
independently. Id. at 491.
225. Id. at 485-87. The Court noted trade secret law has coexisting with patent law for over
100 years. Id. at 493. It noted that Congress, by its silence over the many years of that coexistence,
has seen the wisdom of allowing the states to enforce trade secret law without interference from the
federal government. Id. The Court stated that it would not disturb the balance between trade secret
and patent law unless Congress created a law requiring them to do so. Id.
226. Id. at 487-88. The Court noted that trade secret is a weaker protection than patent
protection because it does not protect against independent creation or reverse engineering. Id. at
489-90. In other words, if a competitor was able to reverse engineer a chemical formula protected
under trade secret law the original inventor would have no cause of action because trade secret only
protects against obtaining secrets through improper means (reverse engineering is not deemed an
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The Court also emphasized that patent law and trade secret law have coexisted harmoniously for over 100 years and that it would not disturb
that balance unless Congress mandated as much through legislation.22 7
Similarly, in Aronson,228 the Supreme Court declared that federal
patent law did not preempt state law. The Court enforced a licensing
agreement for the exclusive right to manufacture and sell a keyholder
design that was commercially successful, but rejected by the PTO as
unpatentable. 2 29 Commercial agreements are traditionally under state
law dominion.230 Furthermore, the Court could not find anything in the
precedent to justify not enforcing the contract.23 1 Instead, the Court
found that licensing agreements positively affected industry and
innovation by encouraging inventions in areas not reached by patent law
and allowing the public access to inventions that are useful, even if not
patentable.232
Despite several Supreme Court cases upholding state law, federal
preemption by the Patent Act is still a viable possibility. 233 In the most
recent Supreme Court case dealing with this issue, Bonita Boats, the
Court held that a Florida statute prohibiting the use of a direct molding
process to copy hull designs was preempted by federal patent law.234
The state statute was an obstacle to federal objectives because it
provided patent-like protection without requiring the invention to

improper means under trade secret law). See id. at 476. On the other hand, patent law protects any
copying of the invention, regardless of the means used to obtain the protected invention. Id.. at 48990.
227. Id. at 493.
228. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979).
229. Id. at 259-62.
230. Id at 262.
231. Id. at 264. During negotiations for the licensing agreement, Quick Point knew that Mrs.
Aronson applied for a patent; it was later rejected by the PTO, after the agreement. Id. at 259-60.
The Court found it persuasive that Quick Point knew that the patent might fail because such a
contingency was put into the contract; yet, after the patent application failed Quick Point wanted to
argue that it shouldn't have to pay any royalties on an unpatented device, looking to federal law to
free it of its contractual obligations. See id. at 261-62.
232. Id. at 266. Quick Point argued that enforcing the licensing agreement, which required
Quick Point to pay royalties to Mrs. Aronson for use of the keyholder idea, was against federal
patent policy of keeping ideas in the public domain. Id. at 263. The court argued that enforcing the
agreement wasn't taking anything out of the public domain because Quick Point would still
continue to sell the keyholders; Quick Point would just have to pay Mrs. Aronson royalties from
those sales, which Quick Point agreed to. Id.
233. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152-55 (1989).
234. Id Bonito Boats developed a hull design for a fiberglass recreational boat. Id. at 141.
Six years after the design was available to the public, Florida Legislature enacted a statute
prohibiting use of a direct molding process to duplicate any manufactured vessel hull without
written permission of the original vessel hull manufacturer. Id.
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undergo the vigorous patent application process, without limiting the
monopoly given to the inventor, and without demanding eventual free
use within the public domain.235 Overall, the body of Supreme Court
decisions regarding preemption of state laws by federal patent law
appears to be an attempt to maintain the delicate balance between the
congressional mission of providing inventor incentives to enlarge
innovation within the public domain, and states' attempts to promote
their own valid local interests.
The purpose of the Patent Act is to provide inventor incentives and
public disclosure in order to promote industry.236 At first glance, this is
not inconsistent with the general goal of the UCC to introduce
uniformity into state laws affecting business and commerce, ultimately
In fact, it was the business
promoting business and industry.
community that urged lawmakers to create a set of uniform rules in the
mid-nineteenth century.238 In this century, the legal and business
community expressed preference for the UCC's filing system because it
is more streamlined and efficient than the current federal filing system
for security interests. 239 The UCC's goal of creating uniform laws to
promote industry seems consistent with the Patent Act because
ultimately the goal of the Patent Act is to promote the progress of
industry. 240 Both the Patent Act and the UCC seem to have the same
general goal; they just have different means of doing so, one through
providing limited monopolies to inventors and the other through
235. Id. at 156-57. Technically the public could still copy hull designs; under the Florida
statute the public was merely prohibited from copying the hull designs in the particular manner
prohibited by the statute. Id. at 157. Nevertheless, the Court found that the statute substantially
impeded public use. Id.
236. Kewanee Oil Co. v. BicronCorp., 416 U.S. 470,480-82 (1974).
237. See DUNCAN & LYONS, supra note 68, at 1-5.
238. Id.
239. See supra pp. 33-35. The financing community has also expressed preference of state,
rather than federal filing. Hearings,supra note 101, at 147. The Vice President of the Commercial
Finance Association (CFA), a trade group for the asset-based financing services industry, stated that
because of the state of federal law regarding copyrights both lenders and borrowers have incurred
significant costs, delay, administrative burdens, and, in some cases, to forego otherwise attractive
financing opportunities. Hearings, supra note 101, at 147. The CFA recognized the need for a
reworking of the federal system, but for now, the CFA advocated UCC filings to perfect security
interests. Hearings, supra note 101, at 147. The Vice President noted that the federal system
impeded efficient and cost-effective commercial financing. Hearings,supranote 101, at 155. Ifthe
current federal filing system impedes financing, it follows that the increased risks and costs of
investment into development decreases incentives to invent, a result directly contrary to the
underlying purpose of the Patent Act.
240. See Integra Lifescis. I, LTD. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting, noting that the purpose of the Patent Act is to "provide a financial incentives to create
new knowledge and bring it to public benefit through new products.").
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uniformity of law. 2 41 There appears to be no substantial issue that state
law would be an obstacle to the federal system.
2. State Law Steps Back
On the other hand, sections of Article 9 strongly suggest that the
UCC itself requires federal filing, thus federal preemption is not
necessary to require federal filing. Drafters of Article 9 included socalled "step-back" provisions in the statute, recognizing that there may
be federal statutes that trump state registration of certain types of
personal properties. 2 42 Section 9-104(a), a step-back provision of the
UCC, declares that Article 9 does not apply to security interests subject
to any federal statute, "to the extent that such statute governs the rights
of parties to or third parties affected by transactions in particular types of
property." 243 Further, section 9-302(a), another step-back provision,
provides that filing a financing statement with the state is actually not
effective perfection, if there is a federal statute or treaty that provides for
a national or international registration system, or the federal statute or
treaty specifies a recording system different than the one dictated by the
UCC.2"
Interestingly enough, Professor Grant Gilmore, cited frequently as
one of the foremost commercial law experts and co-drafter of the
UCC, 245 declared that effective security transfers of patents could only
be made under the federal Patent Act. 24 6 Section 9-302 of the UCC
states in relevant part:
(3) The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this
Article is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in
property subject to.. .(a) a statute or treaty of the United States which
provides for a national or international registration or a national or
international certificate of title or which specifies a place of filing

241. The Supreme Court stated that the federal policy of encouraging invention through
incentives is not disturbed by the existence of another form of incentive, i.e. trade secret law.
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 484.
242. Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1660-61.
243. U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1995).
244. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a) (1995).
245. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Remembering Grant Gilmore, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 67, 67-69 (2002)
(honoring Prof. Gilmore's contribution to the legal community).
246. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 544-45. Professor Gilmore stated that little would be served
and much confusion would result if it were in the power of the state to require state filing of security
interests in patents. Id. Professor Gilmore is the principle draftsman of Article 9. DUNCAN &
LYONS, supra note 68, 1-5 n.6.
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different from that specified in this Article for filing of the security
interest... 247
On its face, this statute seems to defer registration of security interests to
federal laws that provide for a national registration system.2 48 However,
this will depend upon the effect of the phrases "national or international
registration system" and "for filing of the security interest," both of
which are separated by several conjunctions.24 9 It is not clear whether
"for filing of security interests" modifies the entire list, including
"national . . . registration system," or just the final element in the list. 25 0
Accordingly, the statute could be interpreted to exclude perfection under
state law if a federal statute provides for a national registration
system.251 Or, the statute could be interpreted to exclude perfection
under state law only if a federal statute provides for a national
registration system for security interests.25 2 Therefore, if the judiciary
finds that the Patent Act is silent on the issue of registration of security
interests, the UCC does not defer registration of security interests to the
federal scheme because there is no federal scheme for the filing of
253
Nonetheless, if the Patent Act provides
security interests in patents.
for the national registration of security interests in patents, which textual
analysis suggests, 2 54 Article 9's step-back provisions would effectively
require federal filing.2 55

247. Id.
248. See id.
249. See Haemmerli, supranote 19, at 1661-62.
250. Haernmerli, supra note 19, at 1661-62. The last antecedent rule of statutory construction
suggests that the qualifying phrase "for filing of security interests" only refers to the last antecedent,
i.e. the antecedent immediately preceding the qualifying phrase, rather than all antecedents. See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE

CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 857 (4th ed. 1995). The last antecedent rule is that qualifying words
or phrases refer only to the last antecedent, not to all preceding antecedents, unless contrary to
legislative intent. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See supra Part Il.l.A-B (textual analysis of Section 261).
255. See supra Part Il.1 .A-B. On the other hand, it has been argued that even if security
interests were brought under the Patent Act, Article 9 would only be replaced "to the extent that [the
federal] statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular
types of property..." U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1995); Haemmerli, supra note 19, at 1672. This would still
leave states to govern in areas where the federal regime does not, i.e. with respect to claimants other
than assignees. U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1995); Haemmerli, supranote 19, at 1672.
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CaseLaw
1. The Current State of Case Law

The seminal Supreme Court case on patent recording and patents as
collateral, Waterman v. Mackenzie,256 was decided over 100 years ago,
at the tail end of the nineteenth century.2 57 In Waterman, the original
patent owner, Lewis E. Waterman ("Lewis"), assigned his rights to his
wife, Sarah E. Waterman ("Sarah").2 58 Sarah granted Lewis a license to
manufacture and sell the invention.259 Subsequently, Sarah assigned her
rights in the whole patent to the firm of Asa L. Shipman's Sons ("Asa
Firm") as collateral for a loan, subject to defeasance upon payment of
the loan obligation. 2 60 Asa Firm assigned its' rights to Mr. Asa L.
Shipman.261 Sarah then assigned her rights back to Lewis.262 All of the
transfers were recorded with the PTO, except the license to Lewis.263
The issue was whether the plaintiff, Lewis, had standing to sue.2 6
The Court defined the scope of a "whole patent" to be the exclusive
right to make, use, and sell an invention.265 Furthermore, whether an
interest in a patent is a license or assignment does not depend on the
label it is given, but rather on its' legal effect.266 Thus, the grant of a
whole patent-right within a certain district is an assignment, because it
excludes everyone, even the patentee, from making, using, or selling the
invention within that district.267 On the other hand, the grant of an
exclusive right to make and sell within a district, but reserving for the
grantor the right to make within the district and sell outside the district is
a license because it is not a grant of title in the whole patent-right within

the district. 268
The Court interpreted the recording provision of the Patent Act of
1870 to authorize a patentee to assign, grant, or convey either: (1) the
256. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 252 (1891).
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id
260. Id. Sarah's assignment to Asa Firm is an example of a collateral assignment, which was
discussed earlier in the comment. See supra p. 26 (explaining collateral assignments).
261. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 252.
262. Id.
263. Id
264. Id.
265. Id. at 255.
266. Id. Whether the transaction was an assignment or license is key because an assignee had
standing to sue, however, a mere licensee did not. Haemmerli, supranote 19, at 1698.
267. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255.
268. Id
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whole patent-right throughout the United States, (2) an undivided share
of the exclusive rights under the patent, or (3) the exclusive rights under
the patent within a specified part of the United States. 269 The Court
further declared that each of these is a transfer of the whole patent-right,
i.e. the title to the patent, and anything less is a "mere license."270
Because of lack of this title in the patent, the licensee did not have
standing to sue for infringement.27 1
The Court analogizes a mortgage in a patent, intangible personal
property, to mortgage law in real property.272 In real property mortgage
law, the mortgagee is the only entity with standing if the mortgagee has
received both delivery of possession and legal title, because the
mortgagor would no longer have legal rights to the real property.273 if
the mortgagor retained possession, however, the mortgagor may still
have standing to sue because the mortgagor still has some legal rights in
the real property, despite legal title in the mortgagee.27 4 The Supreme
Court also recognized that, by common law and statute, more and more
states were considering mortgages as liens, not transfers of title. 275
Notwithstanding, the Court dismissed the relevance of the lien theory to
the analogy of the patent mortgage to land mortgage because the laws
varied from state to state and it was more commonplace, at the time, to
consider a mortgage a transfer of title.276
The Court declared that recording a patent was equivalent to
delivery of possession because it is intangible property, which cannot
actually be delivered.277 Because the assignment to Asa firm was
recorded with the PTO, i.e. delivered to Asa firm, and legal title was
assigned to Asa firm under the loan agreement, only Asa firm had
standing to sue.278 Thus, the Court in Waterman held that a secured

269. Id. This interpretation of the scope of what a patentee can assign is one of the
fundamental rules of contemporary patent law with respect to ownership. Haemmerli, supra note
19, at 1697.
270. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255.
271. Id. at 258-60. It is interesting to note that today the federal courts have held that some
exclusive licensees may have standing to sue in certain circumstances. Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead
Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
272. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255.
273. Id.
274. Id
275. Id at 258.
276. Id. The Court's dismissal of the lien theory of real property mortgage law was premature
and not supported by the facts. See 11 C.J.S Chattel Mortgage § I n.3[c] (noting that by 1917 the
states were mostly lien theory-I 7 states were title theory and 23 states were lien theory).
277. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 260.
278. Id.at 260-61.
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creditor with legal title, who properly recorded with the PTO, has
standing to sue, while a licensee does not.'" Although Waterman dealt
with the issue of standing, the analysis used by the Supreme Court
regarding the scope of patent assignments, mortgages, and licenses is
still used today.280
A more recent case involved a dispute between the secured creditor
and a bankruptcy trustee.28 1 In In re Transportation Design and
Technology, Inc.,28 2 a former employee of Transportation Design and
Technology (TDT) assigned various patents for wheelchair lifts to
TDT.283 In April 1983, Mitsui gave TDT a loan, backed by a security
interest in after-acquired property, including all "general intangibles,"
such as patents.2 84 Mitsui recorded its security interest under the UCC,
but not with the PTO.285 On January 1984, TDT filed for bankruptcy.286
During the bankruptcy proceedings, Mitsui claimed an interest in TDT's
patents.287 The issue was whether Mitsui was required to file with the
PTO in order to perfect its security interest in the patent.2 88 The court
held that Mitsui was not required to file with the PTO in order to perfect
its security interest to defeat the bankruptcy trustee's claim. 289 The court
revisited Waterman, declaring that it stood for the proposition that a
bona fide purchaser that recorded its ownership interest in a patent or
patent mortgage with the PTO will defeat the interests of a secured
creditor of the patent's grantor or mortgagor who did not record his
security interest in the PTO.290 The court set forth a partial preemption
system, whereby state registration is required to protect interests a
lienholder possesses as against other lienholders. 29 1 On the other hand, a
lienholder must federally register its security interests in order to protect
against transfers of title free of their interest as against bona fide
279. Id. See generally supra note 271 for modern-day rule regarding patent licensee standing.
280. See, e.g., In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001); Refac Int'l v.
Visa USA, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2004, 2027 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
281. In re Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 637 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 638.
290. Id. at 639. But the interests that were defeated in Waterman were not those of a secured
creditor, but rather a licensee. See supra pp. 52-53 (discussing the holding in Waterman). In fact,
the Court stated that the secured creditor, Asa Firm, had standing because the secured transaction,
i.e. the patent mortgage, was recorded in the PTO. Transp. Design & Tech., 48 B.R. at 639.
291. Transp. Design & Tech., 48 B.R. at 639-40.
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purchasers and mortgagees. 92 Under this partial preemption system, the
federal regime would preempt state law to protect secured creditors
against parties with ownership rights; however, state law would continue
to govern the interests of lien creditors against other lien creditors with
respect to patents.293
Recently, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of UCC versus PTO
filing to perfect a security interest. 294 Like In re TransportationDesign
and Technology, Inc.,295 the Ninth Circuit case dealt with a secured
creditor and a bankruptcy trustee vying for rights to a patent.296 In
Cybernetic Services, Matsco, Inc. and Matsco Financial Corporation
("Matsco") had a security interest in a patent developed by Cybernetic
Services, Inc. ("Cybernetic").29 7 Matsco timely and properly filed with
the state, but not with the PTO.298 Subsequently, Cybernetic filed for
bankruptcy.299 Cybernetic's trustee argued that the security interest was
not properly perfected because Matsco did not register with the PTO as
required by section 261 of the federal Patent Act.300 The trustee
supported his argument with federal preemption law.
In addressing the preemption issue, the court acknowledged that
there is no express preemption in the Patent Act; however, precedent has
made clear that conflict preemption will occur if state law upsets the
balance struck by Congress between innovation incentives and free
competition.3 0 ' In order to determine if the balance was upset, the court
tried to determine the meaning and scope of section 261. 302 The Ninth
Circuit declared that the current version of section 261 was enacted
under the Patent Act of 1870, thus, it was important to determine the
meaning and scope in the historical context of the nineteenth century.'o3
292. Id
293. Id This partial preemption scheme seems inefficient and redundant because in order to
protect a creditor's interests against lienholders as well as subsequent purchasers, the creditor would
have to search the state database for competing lienholder interests and then turn around and search
the federal database for any encumbrances from subsequent purchasers or mortgagees. It would
seem more efficient in terms of time, costs, and clarity to only search in one database.
294. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
295. 48 B.R. at 637.
296. CyberneticSerys., 252 F.3d at 1044.
297. Id.
298. Id
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. In re Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 638 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985). See
generally supra Part I11.B (discussing federal preemption in patent law).
302. CyberneticServs., 252 F.3d at 1048.
303. Id. It is questionable whether 1870 is the relevant historical context for textual analysis.
See supra Part III.A. I. (analyzing the text of Section 261).
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The court admitted that security interests have changed much since the
nineteenth century.'0 Nonetheless, the court decided to strictly construe
the language of section 261 such that the trustee could only prevail if the
transaction between the parties was an "assignment, grant, or
conveyance," within the meaning of section 261.3os
The Ninth Circuit decided that an "assignment, grant, or
conveyance" referred only to transfers of ownership, i.e. title.' 06 To do
so, the court cited nineteenth and twentieth-century cases that seemed to
suggest as much.307 The court's interpretation of those cited cases led to
its conclusion that an assignment and a conveyance were considered
transfers of title.30 s
The Ninth Circuit also looked at the Supreme Court case of
Waterman309 decided in 1890. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that section
261 only concerned itself with transactions affecting title because
Waterman held that only a person with title had standing to sue for
patent infringement.31 0 Thus, the court declared that only transfers of
ownership interests, as opposed to lien-type interests, must be registered
federally under section 261 of the Patent Act." Consequently, Matsco
was not required to register with the PTO under section 261, as the
trustee argued." 2
The Ninth Circuit argued that the trustee's argument also failed
because a trustee was not a "subsequent purchaser or mortgagee" and
section 261 only protects federally registered interests as against
subsequent purchasers or mortgagees."
The trustee, however, was
considered a hypothetical lien creditor under bankruptcy law." 4 The
Ninth Circuit found early twentieth-century sources defining a
304. Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1048. Prior to the creation of Article 9 in the 1960s, there
were several ways a party could use personal property as collateral to secure financing: pledge,
chattel mortgage, assignment, trust deed, factor's lien, conditional sale, etc. Id
305. Id. at 1049.
306. Id. A grant was considered a transfer of title, but only as to a specific geographic area.
Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. The UCC drafters regarded discussions of title as "the law of the horse," which was
subterfuge obscuring real substantive issues. See K.N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse
Sales, 52 HARV. L. REv. 873 (1939); K.N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 723 (1939). The UCC drafters made sure that Article 9 did not make that mistake; Article 9
"applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or the debtor." U.C.C. §9-202 (2000).
309. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 252 (1891).
310. Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1051.
311. Id at 1052.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1052-53.
314. Id. at 1055.
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"mortgagee" as one who obtains title to property in order to secure a
loan. t Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that a "purchaser" under
section 261 is a "bona fide purchaser," that is, one who takes full title,
legal and equitable, without notice of the rights of others in the
property. 1 The trustee was merely a lien creditor, with a security
Consequently, the Ninth
interest, but not a title in the property.1
under a strict
protected
Circuit found that the trustee was not
interpretation of the language of section 261."' Ultimately, the court
determined that there was no federal preemption, because registration of
lien creditors is outside the scope of registration required by section 261,
therefore, state law does not conflict with federal patent law.
The trustee's second major argument was that Article 9's step-back
provisions required perfection under the federal registration system.3 20
The court countered by asserting that the Patent Act does not provide for
federal registration of security interests; it only requires federal
registration of interests affecting title.32 1 The Ninth Circuit held that
federal registration with the PTO was not required to perfect a security
interest in the patent. Therefore, Matsco was entitled to the patent under
the bankruptcy proceeding as against the trustee.322
2. Case Law Needs Reexamination in Modem-day Context
Cybernetic Services was decided on shaky grounds. 3 23 As
discussed above, the Ninth Circuit's textual interpretation of section 261
attempts to assert that the language of the statute is clear and plain, but
further evidence shows that the language is very ambiguous, especially
in light of the historical context required of the interpretation.324
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit relied on Waterman to support its
proposition that only titleholders are required to register with the PTO in
order to protect their interests.' However, Waterman is outdated.326

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 1053.
Id.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id. Comparewith supraPart III.B. 1 (discussing federal preemption issues).
Id. at 1058. Compare with supra Part Ill.B.2 (discussing Article 9's stepback provisions).
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1059.
See Griffin, supranote 188, at 774-80.
Supra Part III.A.1.
Cybernetic Servs., 252 F.3d at 1052.
See infra pp. 53-54.
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The issue in Waterman was standing, not registration. Thus, the
reasoning used is mere dicta.32 ' Moreover, the analogy to real property
law used by the Court in Waterman is unnecessary today. Perhaps the
Court analogized patents to real property mortgage law because it was
the closest area of law the Court could find to compare to secured
transactions with patent interests because the UCC did not exist328 and
3 29
the law of security interests in intangibles was relatively new.
Notwithstanding, today we do not need to compare secured transactions
with patents to mortgage law because the law of secured transactions is
thoroughly developed, separate from real property law.330
Additionally, the reasoning the Waterman Court used to support its
conclusion that, like real property law, patent owners who transfer both
title and possession to their lenders do not have standing, does not exist
today.33 ' The Court recognized the lien theory, in which legal title to
Teal property is not transferred to a lender, but dismissed it by declaring
that most states don't follow the lien theory.332 Nonetheless, today, most
Thus, the Court's own analogy would
states do follow the lien theory.
suggest that patent lienholders possess an ownership interest in the
patent, within the scope of section 261.
Furthermore, Waterman equated recordation of intangibles like
patents to possession to support the proposition that the secured creditor
with possession and legal title had standing.3 4 The Court in Waterman
reasoned that in real property law, a mortgagee with both possession and
legal title had standing to the exclusion of a mortgagor without
possession. Therefore, a secured creditor with both possession, i.e. a
recorded interest, and legal title had standing to sue to the exclusion of a
mere licensee.33 ' However, the Court admitted that in real property law,
a mortgagor with possession would have an interest in the real property,
and, therefore, standing to sue.336 However, following that line of

327. Brennan, supranote 82, at 233.
328. DUNCAN & LYONS, supra note 68, at 1-4.
329. DUNCAN & LYONS, supra note 68, at 1-4.
330. See Hearings,supranote 101, at 144.
331. Compare Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1891) (noting that lien theory is
merely an emerging concept), with STEVEN EMMANUEL, EMMANUEL LAW OUTLINES: PROPERTY
142 (Aspen Publishers 2004) (declaring that most states follow the lien theory of mortgages).
332. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 259-60.
333. EMMANUEL, supranote 331, at 142.
334. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 260-6 1.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 258-60.
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reasoning, a secured creditor, by recording with the PTO and/or UCC,
would have "possession" and, therefore, standing to sue.

The court in Cybernetic Services held that the recording provision
of the Patent Act is only concerned with patent titleholders.
Nevertheless, there is case law to support the proposition that section
261 is not just about protecting titleholders. 338 Lien patent mortgages
are valid secured transactions that leave legal title and standing to sue
with the lender, i.e. mortgagor. 339 Thus, use of the word "mortgagee"
does not automatically mean that a lender holds title.3 40 In the 1904 case
of Ormsby v. Conners, a secured transaction left legal title with the
mortgagor and the federal circuit declared that the transaction was
validly recorded with the PTO.34 1 In the 1909 case of Westmoreland
Specialty Co. v. Hogan, the Third Circuit held that the parties created a
patent assignment that was a "temporary pledge" and did not transfer
"title."3 42 Thus, use of the word "assignment" does not automatically
mean that legal title is transferred.3 4 3 The Ninth Circuit's attempt to
narrow section 261 so that it only applies to titleholders is not supported
by case law or reason. It is imperative that either the Supreme Court
reexamine Waterman and its progeny in a modern-day context, or
Congress provide clear guidance through amendment of the Patent Act.
D.

Policy Considerationsfor Providing a Uniform FederalSystem

Obtaining financing for businesses and patent owners is essential to
the advancement of industry and the progress of technology. 3 " Having
one unified system of federal registration, of both security interests and
ownership interests, would provide much needed clarity and efficiency
in the area of patent property interests and financing. 345 Even the UCC,

337. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001).
338. See infra p. 55. Many patent commentators, including Professor Gilmore, have concluded
that Waterman merely stands for the proposition that patent security transfers are valid and
recordable with the PTO. Brennan, supra note 82, at 233. However, the question of title or lien
only affects standing-not PTO recording. Brennan, supranote 82, at 233.
339. Brennan, supra note 82, at 232.
340. See Brennan,supranote 82, at 232.
341. 133 F. 548 (Cir. Mass. 1904).
342. 167 F. 327 (3rd Cir. 1909).
343. See id.
344. See Hearings,supranote 101, at 140.
345. See Hearings, supra note 101, at 221-22 (statement of Mr. Michael K. Kirk, Executive
Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA)).
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as adopted by individual states, cannot provide this, as it will vary
somewhat from state to state.346
As it stands, the Copyright Act was amended to include federal
registration of security interests. 347 Thus, to provide clarity and
uniformity of intellectual property registration, the Patent Act, created
by the same constitutional clause as the Copyright Act,34 8 should
logically follow in kind. This will streamline registration for financiers
because products will often come with a bundle of intellectual property
rights.3 49 For example, a laptop will have patents on its hardware and
circuitry, but will contain copyrights on the software for the operating
system, and a trademark on the identifying name.35 o It will be more
efficient for a financier to only have to file with the federal registration
system for all federally-created intellectual property rights.35 1
The current dual system, in which practitioners file with both the
state and federal system and hope for the best, is redundant and
inefficient. 352 Efforts by Congress and industry towards patent reform
have continuously emphasized the harmful effects of patent law
uncertainty; it creates "duplicative, deal-killing transaction costs." 3 53
Moreover, the high cost of patent litigation caused by uncertainty and
unpredictability in patent law is debilitating to large corporations with
many, sometimes hundreds of patents to defend.354 The result is a

346. See Secured Transactions and UCC Law, Justicia.com, http://www.justia.com/businessoperations/docs/secured-transactions.html (last visited January 21, 2010).
341. See Griffin, supra note 185, at 781. The Copyright Act was amended in 1976 to broaden
the scope of copyright ownership under its scope to include "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive
license, or any other conveyance, alienation or hypothecation of a copyright of any of the exclusive
rights comprised in a copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Today, copyright ownership transfer is broader
than patent ownership transfer; an odd result given that both statutes originate from the same
Constitutional mandate. Brennan, supra note 82, at 287; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
348. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
349. See Hearings,supra note 101, at 140.
350. Hearings,supranote 101, at 140.
351. Hearings, supra note 101, at 224-25 (Mr. Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director of the
AIPLA, noting the mixed approach of recordation of intellectual property between federal and state
filing as between various branches of intellectual property and exclaiming support for a federal
filing system for security interests in intellectual property).
352. See Hearings,supranote 101, at 144.
353. Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearingon HR. 1908 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 65 (2007)
(prepared statement of John R. Thomas, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
354. Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislationand Recent CourtDecisions: Hearings
on S. 515 Before the S. JudiciaryComm., I 1Ith Cong. (2009) (statements of David J. Kappos, Vice
President and Assistant General Counsel, IBM Corp., and Steven R. Appelton, Chairman and Chief
Inc.),
Technology,
Micron
of
Officer
Executive
(webcast). Mr. Kappos favored the
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfn?id=3701
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decrease in incentives to create, a decrease in research jobs available to
the public because companies' research budgets are redirected to
defending patent rights in litigation, and a decrease in the amount of
financing available to finance inventions.3 55 However, before federal
filing of security interests can compete with the UCC's streamlined
system, Congress must update the federal system to accommodate afteracquired property interests and mirror the simplified filing system
outlined by the UCC, as urged by industry.356
Federal filing would also provide a nationwide scope for the
registration of all intellectual property interests, 3s7 which are so
Federal filing would
important to national economic interests.3"
provide nationwide notice to all interested parties, rather than statecentric notice. 359
IV. CONCLUSION

Industry has advised the importance of after-acquired patent
interests and floating liens and the streamlined recording system
provided by the UCC.3 60 However, these are arguments for Congress or
the Commissioner of the PTO to update the current patent registration
system. It is the job of the courts to uphold the letter of the law, not to
bend the law in order to make up for legislative or executive inertia.3 61
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the statutory text and concluded that
section 261 does not cover secured transactions.362 Nevertheless, further
historical textual analysis suggests that the language of the section does
not necessarily exclude secured transactions or non-title transfers.363 In
any case, secured transactions may include title transfers, thus the Ninth

proposed bill, emphasizing that clarity in the patent system would greatly increase the value of
patents in the aggregate. Id. Mr. Appelton stated that Micron possessed over 18,000 U.S. patents
and pressed upon the senators that 100,000 engineering and research jobs could've been created if
patent litigation damages were reduced. Id.
355. Id. See Hearings,supranote 101, at 140-44; STORY, supranote 41, at 402.
356. Hearings,supra note 101, at 99.
357. See Hearings,supra note 101, at 243 (statement of Q. Todd Dickinson, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Commerce and Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks).
358. See Toren et al., supra note 3, at 300 (discussing the increasing importance of the use of
intellectual property as collateral for business loans).
359. Toren et al., supra note 3, at 300.
360. See suprapp. 31-32.
361. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, with U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, with U.S. CONsT. art. Ill, §
I (separation of powers).
362. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001).
363. Supra pp. 20-38 (Part III.A.1, analyzing the text using historical meaning).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol5/iss3/2

42

Jun: The Imperfect State of Patent Perfection

201l]

THE IMPERFECT STATE OF PATENT PERFECTION

321

Circuit's interpretation does not itself exclude secured transactions.M
Furthermore, the case law that the Ninth Circuit used in support of its
holding is outdated. 365 The issue of registration to protect security
interests in patents must be re-analyzed in a modem-day context.366
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court missed its opportunity to clarify the
issue when it denied certiorari to the Cybernetic Services.
Without clear guidance from Congress, the registration system for
security interests in patents will continue in its current state of confusion.
Given the increasing use of intellectual property assets to secure
368
Moreover, the unstable state
financing, this is not an acceptable state.
patent rights decreases the
in
interests
of patent law regarding competing
value of patents. 36 9 The end result is increased transaction costs for both
law firms and financial institutions, unnecessary and costly litigation,
and increased risks associated with investing in innovation. 37 0 There is
currently a strong effort in Congress to pass a patent reform bill.3 7 Now
would be an ideal time for Congress to update the current federal filing
system. Unfortunately, it is uncertain that this particular issue will make
its way into the bill.372

364. Supra pp. 29-30 (explaining that by the Ninth Circuits own rule, i.e. that only title
transfers are covered by Section 261, security transfers may be covered by Section 261 because
some security transfers may include title transfers).
365. Supra Part 111. LC (examining the case law on the issue of registration of security interests
in patents).
366. Supra Part 111.1 .C.
367. Cybernetic Servs, 252 F.3d at 1045; Stevens, supra note 32, at 42.
368. See SIMENSKY & BRYER, supra note 4, at 300.
369. See Hearings,supra note 101, at 140-44; STORY, supra note 41, at 402.
370. Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearingon H.R. 1908 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 65 (2007)
(prepared statement of John R. Thomas, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
See also Hearings,supra note 101, at 144.
371. The Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); The Patent Reform Act of
2009, H.R. 1260, 111 th Cong. (2009).
372. See id. Neither the House nor Senate version of the Patent Reform Act of 2009 includes
reforms to the registration of security interests in patents. Id.
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